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The Evolution of North Carolina's Comparative Proportionality
Review in Capital Cases
In Furman v. Georgia1 the United States Supreme Court held that the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit
state capital sentencing schemes that operate at the unfettered discretion of the
sentencing authority.2 Death may be imposed only after the sentencing author-
ity has followed specific guidelines designed to ensure fair, nonarbitrary sentenc-
ing.3 Sentencing bodies, however, must be allowed to exercise limited discretion
to assure that the particular circumstances of the crime and the defendant in
each case are considered before deciding on an appropriate sentence. Thus, the
Court also has rejected mandatory capital sentencing as constitutionally imper-
missible.4 Consistent with these dual goals of nondiscretionary and particular-
ized sentencing, many states have enacted "guided discretion" capital sentencing
statutes. 5 Typically, in a guided discretion scheme the jury must consider evi-
dence of both aggravating 6 and mitigating7 circumstances. Death may be im-
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 239-40. Furman was a per curiam decision with nine separate opinions (five concur-
ring, four dissenting). Justice Stewart argued that it was cruel and unusual punishment to impose
the death penalty on a "selected random handful" of defendants at the discretion of the jury. Id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 255-57. While the United States Supreme Court did not create guidelines for accepta-
ble capital sentencing procedures in Furman, the Court has approved state capital sentencing
schemes in several subsequent cases. See, eg., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (plurality opinion). The Court also has invalidated some capital sentencing procedures. See,
e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
At issue in Woodson was North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, Act of April 8, 1973, ch.
1201, §1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp.
1975)), which called for the automatic imposition of the death penalty upon conviction of first degree
murder. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional on three grounds. First, the statute
failed to take into.consideration the "character and record of the individual offender and the circum-
stances of the particular offense." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. Second, the statute failed to reflect
"contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the punishment of death." Id. at 301. Last,
the Court noted that juries might be unwilling to convict defendants charged with first degree mur-
der in light of the mandatory death sentence such a conviction imposed. Id. at 302-03.
5. "In response to [Furman], roughly two-thirds of the States promptly redrafted their capital
sentencing statutes in an effort to limit jury discretion .... " Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876
(1984). North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983), is fairly
typical. The statute provides for a bifurcated procedure in capital felony cases: the guilt and sen-
tencing phases of the trial are conducted separately. Id. § 15A-2000(a). At the sentencing phase,
evidence may be presented to the jury relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id.
§ 15A-2000(a)(3). The jury decides whether to impose death or life imprisonment by weighing the
circumstances: if the aggravating circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances, the defendant may be sentenced to death. Id. § 15A-2000(b)(1) to (3). The sentence recom-
mendation must be unanimous; if the jury cannot agree on a sentence the trial judge must impose a
sentence of life imprisonment. Id. § 15A-2000(b). A jury recommending death must return in writ-
ing the statutory aggravating circumstances found. Id. § 15A-2000(c)(1). For a discussion of the
history and application of the North Carolina capital sentencing statute, see Comment, Capital Pun-
ishment in North Carolina: The 1977 Death Penalty Statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court,
59 N.C.L. REv. 911 (1981).
6. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1983).
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posed only upon a finding of one or more aggravating circumstances and only if
such circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances found.8
As an added "safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences," 9
many states incorporate a proportionality review into their capital sentencing
procedures. 10 There are two basic types of proportionality review. 1 Tradi-
tional proportionality review examines the "appropriateness of a sentence for a
particular crime."' 12 For example, a traditional proportionality review might ex-
amine whether the death penalty is too severe a punishment for kidnapping.
13
The second type of proportionality review-the subject of this Note-is
comparative proportionality review. 14 Comparative proportionality procedures
require the reviewing court to compare the case under review to "similar" cases
previously decided in the same jurisdiction. The court must decide "whether the
[death] penalty is .. .unacceptable .. .because [such penalty is] dispropor-
tionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime."'
15
Unless the case is found to be sufficiently similar to other cases in which the
death penalty has been imposed, the death penalty will be deemed dispropor-
tionate. Although comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally re-
quired, 16 the United States Supreme Court clearly approves of such review in
capital sentencing procedures.'
7
7. See, ag., id. § 15A-2000(f).
8. Id. § 15A-2000(c).
9. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 879 (1984).
10. Thirty-two states currently provide for proportionality review, either by statute or case law.
See Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786, 793 n.61
(1983) (complete listing of proportionality statutes).
11. See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875-76 (1984).
12. Id. at 875.
13. The United States Supreme Court has invalidated statutes after applying traditional propor-
tionality analysis in several cases. See, ag., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227 (1983) (life imprisonment
without possibility of parole disproportionate punishment for issuing a $100 bad check); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty disproportionate punishment for an accessory to robbery
convicted of murder under the felony murder rule); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death
penalty disproportionate punishment for the rape of an adult victim); see also D. PANNICK, JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1982) (discussing traditional proportionality principles).
14. This type of review has been described as "proportionality review," "comparative excessive-
ness," "comparative sentence review," and "comparative proportionality review." See Baldus, Pu-
laski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentencing: An Empirical Study of the Georgia
Experience, 741. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 663 n.1 (1983). Thirty-one states require compar-
ative proportionality review. Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit
of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1189 n.382 (1984).
15. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876 (1984).
16. The issue in Pulley was "whether the Eighth Amendment. .. requires a state appellate
court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare the sentence in the case before it with the
penalties imposed in similar cases." Id. The Court unequivocally rejected the concept of constitu-
tionally mandated comparative proportionality review, holding that "there is . . .no basis in our
cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every
case." Id. at 879.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that comparative proportionality review is constitutionally
required. Brennan noted that while comparative proportionality review is no panacea to the
problems inherent in any capital sentencing scheme, "such review often serves to identify the most
extreme examples of disproportionality among similarly situated defendants. . .[and] to eliminate
some of the irrationality that currently surrounds imposition of a death sentence." Id. at 890 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
17. See eg., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983) (the Court upheld a death sentence
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Two determinations are central to the effective functioning of a comparative
proportionality review scheme. First, the reviewing court must define the group
or "pool" of cases that are to be used in making similarity comparisons.1 8 Sec-
ond, the court must decide how to determine similarity: the court must identify
the factors that will be considered pertinent in comparing one case to another.1 9
This Note will examine how North Carolina has dealt with these issues in the
development and application of its comparative proportionality review
procedure.
The current North Carolina capital sentencing statute was enacted in
1977.20 Under the statute any case in which the jury imposes a sentence of
death is automatically appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.21 On
appeal the court reviews assignments of error from both the guilt and sentencing
phases of the trial.22 If both phases are found to be error-free,2 3 the court then
undertakes three additional inquiries. First, the court examines whether the rec-
ord supports the "jury's findings of any aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances upon which the sentencing court based its sentence of death."'24 Second,
the court must determine that the sentence was not imposed "under the influ-
under Georgia's capital sentencing statute, stating that "[o]ur decision in this case depends in part on
the existence of an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death
sentence. . . to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
198 (1976) ("[a]s an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice. . . [the Geor-
gia Supreme Court] is required by statute. . . [to determine] whether the sentence is disproportion-
ate compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases.").
Several theories have been advanced for the necessity of comparative proportionality review.
Such review "may be the best means of ensuring that a state's statutory capital sentencing scheme is
functioning within. . . eighth amendment guidelines. . . [because it] measures the consistency with
which sentencing authorities impose the death penalty-a crucial factor in discerning potentially
cruel and unusual punishment." Special Project, supra note 14, at 1189. Comparative proportional-
ity review is "the only review technique which tests capital sentences against accumulated evidence
of contemporary mores, as required by Woodson." Goodpaster, supra note 10, at 814.
18. Possible pools include all the cases in which (1) the defendant was convicted of a capital
crime, (2) the defendant was convicted of a capital crime or pleaded guilty to a capital crime as a
part of a plea-bargaining arrangement, (3) the defendant was sentenced to death, (4) the defendant
was sentenced to death and the sentence was affirmed on appeal, (5) the defendant was sentenced to
death or life imprisonment and the sentence was affirmed on appeal.
19. The United States Supreme Court has held that to impose a death penalty the sentencing
authority must consider the particular circumstances of the crime and of the defendant and that
there must be a "principled way to distinguish [a] case, in which the death penalty was imposed,
from the many cases in which it was not." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). Beyond
these guidelines it is not clear what factors a court may or should consider controlling in assessing
similarity. In any fact situation there are many different possible comparison factors. For example,
if an intoxicated 18 year-old defendant is convicted of the first degree murder of two store clerks
during an armed robbery, the case could be compared on proportionality review to armed robbery
cases, youthful offender cases, multiple murder cases, felony murder cases, diminished capacity
cases, or some combination of these cases.
20. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407. North Carolina drew heavily on
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) in creating the current statute. State v.
Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 60, 257 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1979).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (1983). The current statute allows imposition of the death
penalty only upon a conviction of first degree murder. Id. § 14-17 (1981).
22. Id. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (1983).
23. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 45, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983) (proportionality review is
performed by the court only if both phases of the trial are error-free).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983).
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ence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor."25 Last, the court must
conduct a comparative proportionality review. The court must overturn the
death sentence and impose life imprisonment "upon a finding that the sentence
of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant."
2 6
North Carolina's comparative proportionality scheme is intended to serve
"as a check against the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty" 27
and to assure that "individualized consideration [is] given to the defendant
before the death sentence can be upheld."'28 In carrying out its proportionality
review, the court must be "sensitive not only to the mandate of the Legislature,
but also to the constitutional dimensions of [the] review." 29
For purposes of assessing similarity, the court recognizes the "pool" of
cases available for comparison purposes as
all cases arising since the effective date of our capital punishment stat-
ute, 1 June 1977, which have been tried as capital cases and reviewed
on direct appeal by this Court and in which the jury recommended
death or life imprisonment or in which the trial court imposed life im-
prisonment after the jury's failure to agree upon a sentencing recom-
mendation within a reasonable period of time.
30
This pool is further limited to only those cases that have been affirmed on appeal
by the North Carolina Supreme Court.3 1 The court also may "suspend consid-
eration of death penalty cases until such time as the court determines it is pre-
pared to make the comparisons required under the provisions" of the statute.
32
In conducting the proportionality review, the court compares "the case at
bar with other cases in the pool which are roughly similar with regard to the
crime and the defendant."' 33 Significant factors in comparing cases are "the
manner in which the crime was committed and defendant's character, back-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 46, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983).
28. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 36, 301 S.E.2d 308, 329, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983).
29. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 236, 283 S.E.2d 732, 753 (1981) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976), and Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1976)), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1038 (1982).
30. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
31. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 45, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983). As of January 30, 1985, the
proportionality pool consisted of 88 cases. See infra Appendix. For a compilation of additional
information on some of these cases, see Petersen, Outline of Legal Principles Established by the North
Carolina Supreme Court for Capital Cases Under G.S. § 154-2000, 1977-1983, in NORTH CAROLINA
CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL 39-46 (1983). The North Carolina Supreme Court has made
clear that in conducting a comparative proportionality review, it will not "necessarily feel bound
to give a citation to every case in the pool of 'similar cases' used for comparison." State v.
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81, 301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983). The North Carolina Supreme Court never has
invoked this language. Presumably, this language would enable the court to defer review of a death
penalty case until such time as sufficiently similar cases become available for comparative review
purposes.
33. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984). Thus, the court need not
compare the case under review with every case in the pool, but only with those deemed roughly
similar.
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ground, and physical and mental condition."3 4 For purposes of proportionality
review, if the trial court finds one or more mitigating circumstances 35 but does
not specify exactly what those mitigating circumstances are, the reviewing court
must assume that the jury found all the mitigating circumstances submitted for
consideration in the sentencing phase.3 6 Other than the general guidelines men-
tioned above, the North Carolina Supreme Court has not established a frame-
work for consistently conducting a comparative proportionality review. 37
Although the provisions for comparative proportionality review were en-
acted in 1977,38 the North Carolina Supreme Court did not have occasion to
apply the scheme until 1979. In State v. Barfield39 the court applied the propor-
tionality review for the first time. The court concluded that the death penalty
was not excessive or disproportionate considering "the manner in which death
was inflicted and the way in which [the] defendant conducted herself after she
administered the poison to [the victim.]"' 4 Clearly the court did not conduct a
true comparative proportionality review in Barfield. Instead of comparing
Barfield to similar cases in the proportionality pool, the court merely applied the
traditional proportionality test-general appropriateness of the punishment for
the crime at issue 4 1-and decided that the death penalty was not excessive or
inappropriate in Barfield's case. In a line of cases following Barfield the court
continued this conclusory review, simply stating that the death penalty was not
disproportionate without citing or analyzing specific similar or dissimilar
cases.
4 2
34. Id.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (1983).
36. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984).
37. Highly structured quantitative schemes for assessing similarities between cases have been
suggested by some commentators. See, eg., Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 14 (advocat-
ing statistical analysis of similarity variables using a computer-based data management system); Dix,
Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97 (1979) (analyzing appellate review
of death penalty cases in Georgia, Florida, and Texas). The North Carolina Supreme Court rejects
such quantitative factor analyses on several grounds. First, the court has noted that the factors used
for comparative proportionality review "are not readily subject to complete enumeration and defini-
tion." State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 80, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
"[The relevant] factors will be as numerous and as varied as the cases coming before us on appeal."
Id. Second, the use of quantitative analysis in comparing cases would tend to "become the last word
on the subject of proportionality rather than serving as the initial point of inquiry." Id. at 80-81, 301
S.E.2d at 356. Third, the courts might tend to base their decisions on the scientific analyses rather
than the "experienced judgments of [their] own members." Id. at 81, 301 S.E.2d at 356. Last, the
court believes that sole reliance on scientific analysis would deny the defendant "the constitutional
right to 'individualized consideration.'" Id. Consistent with this goal of individualized considera-
tion, the court has held that "although the cases in the pool offer guidance in determining whether a
sentence of death in a particular case is excessive or disproportionate, ultimately each case must rest
on its own unique facts." State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 519, 324 S.E.2d 250, 263 (1985).
38. See supra note 20.
39. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980). In Barfield defend-
ant was convicted of poisoning the victim to death for pecuniary gain. The evidence indicated that
defendant previously had poisoned four others, also for pecuniary gain. Id. at 310-16, 259 S.E.2d at
518-22.
40. Id. at 355, 259 S.E.2d at 544.
41. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
42. See, eg., State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 186, 293 S.E.2d 569, 591 ("mT1he record before us
reveals two of the most blood-thirsty and brutal crimes which have ever been reviewed by this Court
.... The bloody facts disclosed by the record before us leave this Court no choice but to conclude
[Vol. 63
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In State v. Hutchins 4 3 the North Carolina Supreme Court for the first time
identified cases used for comparison purposes in conducting its proportionality
review.
The present case does not present the situation in which a victim
was brutally murdered in such a way that the episode could be charac-
terized as being a torture slaying. Compare State v. Martin, [citation
omitted]; State v. McDowell, [citation omitted]. . . . However, the
record clearly establishes a course of conduct on the part of defendant
which amounts to a wanton disregard for the value of human life and
for the enforcement of the law by duly appointed authorities. These
factors lead us to conclude that the sentence of death is not dispropor-
tionate or excessive. 44
It is not clear from this language what factors in the cited cases the court
deemed sufficiently similar to support imposition of the death penalty against
Hutchins.45
In State v. Pinch 46 the court again identified cases used for comparison in
conducting its proportionality review. The court cited six previous cases in
which the death penalty had been affirmed, but did not discuss any particular
that the sentence of death imposed is not disproportionate or excessive."), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1080 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 711, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276 (no cases cited) ("The sentence
of death for the intentional, deliberate and senseless murder of [the victim] was not excessive or
disproportionate."), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 292, 283
S.E.2d 761, 787 (1981) ("[Because] the murder of [the victim] was, simply put, a cold-blooded killing
of an innocent woman on her way to work, we see no reason to reverse the judgment of the jury.
The sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate."), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 (1983);
State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 236, 283 S.E.2d 732, 753 (1981) ("Defendant's sadistic and blood-
thirsty crimes committed against this victim compel the conclusion that the sentence of death is not
disproportionate or excessive."), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246,
256, 278 S.E.2d 214, 220-21 ("The brutal manner in which death was inflicted, which followed
defendant's declaration approximately six months previously that he was going to kill [the victim],
leads us to conclude that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate."), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 294, 271 S.E.2d 286, 296 (1980) ("Consider-
ing the brutal manner in which... [the victims were murdered] and considering defendant's prior
history of violent criminal behavior, we conclude that the sentence of death is not excessive."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). The North Carolina Supreme Court's perfunctory review of death
penalty cases during this period led one commentator to note that the court "appears to be engaging
in cursory or rubber stamp review." Comment, Evolving Standards of Decency: The Constitutional-
ity of North Carolina's Capital Punishment Statute, 16 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 737, 759 (1980).
43. 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981). Hutchins was convicted of the first degree murder of
two police officers who responded to a call from Hutchins' daughter. The daughter claimed that
Hutchins was drunk, had beaten her, and had threatened other family members. Hutchins shot the
officers as they were getting out of their police car in the Hutchins' driveway. Id. at 327, 279 S.E.2d
at 793.
44. Id. at 357, 279 S.E.2d at 810. The two cases used for comparison by the court were State v.
Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981) and State v. McDowell, 301
N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
45. The court might have intended to imply that the stated "wanton disregard for the value of
human life" was a similar factor in the cited cases. It also is interesting to note that the court
specified the disregard of law enforcement as a ground for upholding the death penalty. Hutchins,
303 N.C. at 357, 279 S.E.2d at 810. See infra note 111.
46. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). In Pinch defendant was
convicted of two counts of first degree murder. Defendant had expressed a dislike for and intention
to kill the victims. He borrowed a shotgun, went to a club and shot both victims in the chest at close
range. The second victim pleaded for his life before being shot. One victim was killed instantly; the
other victim lay moaning on the ground until defendant shot him again. Id. at 4-6, 292 S.E.2d at
210-11.
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factors that made these six cases similar to Pinch.47 In affirming the death pen-
alty, the court concluded that "[a]ll things considered, we cannot say, as a mat-
ter of law, that this defendant is somehow less deserving of capital punishment
than the other occupants of death row."'48 Two justices noted that the majority
had failed to identify the relevant pool of cases for purposes of proportionality
review.4 9 Justice Exum, in dissent, urged as a comparison pool all cases tried
under the 1977 death penalty statute in which the defendant had received the
death penalty or life imprisonment.50
In State v. Williams 5 1 the court adopted Justice Exum's proposed propor-
tionality pool.52 In conducting the proportionality review the Williams court
cited no cases, but simply stated that they had made "a comparison of this case
to the cases in the pool of 'similar cases.' -53 The court concluded that the
murder was "so brutal and so utterly senseless as to lead us to conclude that the
sentence of death imposed in this case is not disproportionate."'5 4
For the first time in State v. McDougall,55 a companion case to Williams,
the court identified specific variables in the cases chosen for comparison upon
which its decision to uphold the death penalty was based. In McDougall defend-
ant was convicted of stabbing his victim to death while he was under the influ-
ence of cocaine.5 6 The jury found as mitigating circumstances defendant's
impaired capacity57 and his mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the
murder.5 8 On review, the court noted that "[w]hile these findings are often per-
47. Id. at 35-36, 292 S.E.2d at 228. The six cases were State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 301, 283 S.E.2d
732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 (1983); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981); State v.
Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979),
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
48. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 35, 292 S.E.2d at 228. The court also noted that the death penalty
"doles] not seem excessive or disproportionate considering the premeditated and callous manner in
which the defendant calmly shot and killed two people in cold blood, suddenly and without any
provocation by them, for reasons exhibiting a wanton disregard for human life." Id. at 37, 292
S.E.2d at 229. Thus, it appears the court upheld the death penalty in Pinch not as a result of com-
parison with similar cases, but simply on the facts of the case itself.
49. Id. at 62, 292 S.E.2d at 229-30 (Carlton, J., concurring); id. at 59, 292 S.E.2d at 242-43
(Exum, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 60-61, 292 S.E.2d at 243 (Exum, J., dissenting).
51. 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983). In Williams defendant was
convicted of sexually assaulting and beating to death a 100-year-old woman. Id. at 51-55, 301
S.E.2d at 339-41.
52. Id. at 79, 301 S.E.2d at 355; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. Williams, 308 N.C. at 82, 301 S.E.2d at 357.
54. Id. The court continued this perfunctory review, citing affirmed death penalty cases with-
out discussion, in a case following Williams. See State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 464, 302 S.E.2d 740,
750-51 (no cases cited) ("We... have compared this case with all similar cases.. . [and] [w]c
believe that the imposition of the death penalty. . . is not disproportionate."), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 263 (1983).
55. 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983). In McDougall defendant
was convicted of stabbing the victim to death after he had tricked the victim and her roommate into
letting him into their home by pretending that he needed to use the phone to get medical assistance
for his wife. Id. at 5-7, 301 S.E.2d at 311-13.
56. Id. at 7, 301 S.E.2d at 313.
57. Id. at 16, 301 S.E.2d at 318.
58. Id.
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suasive on the jury in recommending life imprisonment, they are not conclu-
sive."159 The court noted cases in which juries had sentenced the defendant to
death when the defendant had exhibited impaired capacity and emotional distur-
bance; the court noted similar cases in which the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment. 6° The court distinguished McDougall from the life imprison-
ment cases on the ground that the defendant in McDougall might have volunta-
rily injected the cocaine that resulted in impaired capacity and emotional
disturbance. 6 1 The court reasoned that the jury thus could have given the miti-
gating circumstances less weight than in the life imprisonment cases. 62 Based on
this conclusion, the court found McDougall to be sufficiently dissimilar from the
life imprisonment cases and affirmed the death penalty.
63
The court employed a more stringent analysis in conducting its compara-
tive proportionality review in several cases decided in 1984. In State v. Lawson
64
defendant was interrupted by the victim homeowner while burglarizing a house.
Defendant shot and killed the homeowner and also shot the homeowner's father
to eliminate witnesses to the burglary.6 5 In conducting the proportionality re-
view the court considered a number of factors. The Lawson jury found two
aggravating circumstances: murder for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest
66
and murder committed as a part of a course of conduct of violence against other
persons.67 The court noted that the latter circumstance had been found by the
jury in seven of the fourteen cases in which the death penalty had been af-
firmed. 68 The court also compared mitigating circumstances, noting that in Wil-
liams as well as in Lawson the jury found as mitigating the defendant's lack of
prior convictions. 69 The court continued the proportionality review by compar-
ing Lawson to cases in which a similar type of crime had been committed. The
court identified another case in which the victim surprised the defendant who
was in the act of burglarizing the victim's home70 and cited similar robbery-
murder cases. 7 1 Defendant's character, background, and physical and mental
condition also were cited as grounds for similarity comparisons. 72 After noting
59. Id. at 36, 301 S.E.2d at 329.
60. Id. at 36 nn.9-10, 301 S.E.2d at 329 nn.9-10.
61. Id. at 37, 301 S.E.2d at 329.
62. Id.
63. Id. In another 1983 case, State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983), the court
upheld the death penalty for a defendant convicted of murdering a witness during an armed robbery.
The court compared the case to State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1056 (1982), a robbery-murder case in which the death penalty was affirmed, and held the death
penalty not disproportionate. Central to the Oliver court's decision was the fact that the murder was
motivated chiefly by the desire to eliminate witnesses to the armed robbery. Oliver, 309 N.C. at 375,
307 S.E.2d at 335.
64. 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
65. Id. at 634-35, 314 S.E.2d at 495-96.
66. Id. at 637, 314 S.E.2d at 497.
67. Id. at 637-38, 314 S.E.2d at 497.
68. Id. at 648-49, 314 S.E.2d at 503-04.
69. Id. at 649, 314 S.E.2d at 504; Williams, 308 N.C. at 57, 301 S.E.2d at 342.
70. Lawson, 310 N.C. at 649, 314 S.E.2d at 504. The cited case was Williams.
71. Lawson, 310 N.C. at 649-51, 314 S.E.2d at 504-05.
72. Id. at 650-51, 314 S.E.2d at 504-05.
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the similarities and dissimilarities of the relevant cases, the court concluded that
the death penalty should be upheld because cases in which life imprisonment
had been imposed were "for the most part distinguishable on the basis of the
absence of an aggravating factor present in this case or the presence of mitigat-
ing factors absent in this case."' 73
In the next death penalty case affirmed by the court, State v. Maynard,74
the court returned to the pre-Lawson practice of dispensing with the proportion-
ality review; the court made a conclusory determination that the death penalty
was not disproportionate and supported this conclusion with case citations 75 but
without discussion or analysis. Central to the court's decision to uphold the
death penalty in Maynard, another witness elimination case, were "compelling
policies which encourage witnesses to testify in criminal trials without fear."'76
Although the court then cited without discussion two cases in support of its
similarity comparisons, 77 it seems clear that the Maynard proportionality review
focused on a single facet of the crime-witness elimination-as a basis of com-
parison. The court did not analyze any other aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances or characteristics of the crime or defendant. The decision to affirm the
death penalty, based primarily on a single feature of the crime, is uncomfortably
similar to the mandatory death penalty sentencing schemes outlawed in Wood-
son v. North Carolina.78
The North Carolina Supreme Court conducted a somewhat more detailed
proportionality review in two recent cases. Defendant in State v. Boyd 79 stabbed
his ex-lover to death in the presence of her mother and child. The court com-
pared Boyd to another murder case involving a domestic relationship in which
the death penalty had been upheld.80 The court observed that in both cases the
murder was preceded by threats against the victim and that the victim was not
murdered "in a quick and efficient manner." 81 The court also noted that in both
cases the victim was murdered in the presence of her child and that both defend-
73. Id. at 651, 314 S.E.2d at 505.
74. 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197, cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984). In Maynard defendant beat,
stabbed, and shot the victim and then threw the victim into a river, to keep the victim from testifying
against defendant. Id. at 5-7, 316 S.E.2d at 200-01.
75. Id. at 36, 316 S.E.2d at 216.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court cited State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448
U.S. 907 (1980), and State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983), noting that in both those
cases the motivation for the murders was to "avoid detection or arrest." Maynard, 311 N.C. at 36
n.3, 316 S.E.2d at 216 n.3.
78. 428 U.S. 280 (1976); see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
79. 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2052 (1985).
80. Id. at 435, 319 S.E.2d at 207. The court compared Boyd to State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246,
278 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981), in which defendant shot his estranged wife to
death in front of their young child.
81. Boyd, 311 N.C. at 435, 319 S.E.2d at 207. The suffering experienced by the victim before
death is often noted as a consideration in the review of death penalty cases. See, eg., Boyd, 311 N.C.
408, 319 S.E.2d 189; State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056
(1982); State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State
v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. Barfield, 298
N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cerL denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
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ants "presented evidence of social and emotional problems."' 82 The court re-
viewed the estranged lover and estranged spouse murder cases in which the
defendant had received life imprisonment and found them to be dissimilar. 83
In another case involving a domestic relationship, State v. Noland,84 the
court focused on previous murder cases involving domestic relationships85 as
well as previous cases that involved "death or serious injury to one or more
people other than the murder victim."'86 Because Noland was similar to these
previous cases the court affirmed the death penalty. A dissent 87 examined the
case with an emphasis on completely different factors. The dissent compared the
case with other mental disturbance cases, noting that the death penalty generally
had not been imposed when mental and emotional disturbance was found to be a
mitigating circumstance 88 and that the death penalty previously had been up-
held in domestic murder cases only when the murder was particularly brutal and
the victim had been made to suffer needlessly.8 9 Thus, the supreme court's re-
view of Noland illustrates that a case logically can be compared with previous
cases using completely different variables90 and that the choice of different com-
parison variables may lead to an entirely different result.
In State v. Huffstetler,9 1 decided only one month after Noland, the court
inexplicably returned to cursory review.92 In Huffstetler the court cited no cases
in support of its decision to uphold the death penalty, but simply stated that
the record before us reveals a senseless, unprovoked, exceptionally bru-
tal, prolonged and murderous assault by an adult male upon a sixty-
five year old female.. . . Having compared the defendant and the
crime in this case to others in the pool of similar cases, we conclude
that the sentence of death. . . is not disproportionate. 93
A strong dissent criticized the majority's failure to identify the cases on which
the proportionality review was based and alluded to possible constitutional
problems raised by such a perfunctory review.94
82. Boyd, 311 N.C. at 435, 319 S.E.2d at 207.
83. Id. at 436, 319 S.E.2d at 207.
84. 312 N.C. 1, 320 S.E.2d 642 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1232 (1985). In Noland defend-
ant's estranged wife moved to another state. Defendant threatened to kill his wife's family unless she
returned to North Carolina. When his wife refused to return, defendant carried out his threat,
killing her father and sister and severely injuring her mother. Id. at 4-6, 320 S.E.2d at 645-46.
85. Id. at 24-25, 320 S.E.2d at 656. The court cited Boyd and Martin as comparable domestic
relations murder cases. Id. The court also noted that in all three cases the defendant previously had
threatened the murder victims. Id.
86. Noland, 312 N.C. at 25, 320 S.E.2d at 656.
87. Id. at 25, 320 S.E.2d at 657 (Exum, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 33, 320 S.E.2d at 661 (Exum, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Exum, J., dissenting).
90. See supra note 19.
91. 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1877 (1985). In Huffstetler
defendant brutally beat his mother-in-law to death with a cast iron skillet. Id. at 95-98, 322 S.E.2d
at 113-15. See Note, State v. Huffstetler: Denying Mitigating Instructions in Capital Cases on
Grounds of Relevancy, 63 N.C.L. REv. 1122 (1985).
92. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
93. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. at 118, 322 S.E.2d at 126.
94. Id. at 123, 322 S.E.2d at 129 (Exum, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that:
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Since 1977, the North Carolina Supreme Court has vacated the death pen-
alty in four cases based on a finding of disproportionality. In State v. Jackson95
defendant feigned car trouble and persuaded a passerby to give him a ride to a
local service station. The victim later was found in his car, robbed and mur-
dered. 96 In holding the death sentence disproportionate, the court noted that in
Jackson, unlike the other robbery-murder cases in which the death penalty was
imposed, there was no evidence as to the exact circumstances of the victim's
death and thus no reason to conclude that the murder had been "especially hei-
nous."' 97 The court concluded that this murder did not "rise to the level of those
murders in which we have approved the death sentence upon proportionality
review."98
The court again vacated the death penalty in State v. Bondurant.99 Pivotal
in its decision that the case was not similar to other death penalty cases were
findings that defendant did not "coldly calculate" the commission of the crime,
that it was not a "torturous" murder, and that the murder did not occur while
defendant was perpetrating another felony. 100 The court also noted that in this
case defendant was highly intoxicated, that there apparently was no motive in
the shooting, that defendant and victim were friends, that defendant helped rush
the victim to the hospital immediately after the shooting, and that defendant was
The majority seems to treat the [proportionality] issue as being one exclusively within this
Court's unbridled discretion.
I think the question of proportionality... is more serious than this. It is not a
question for the unbridled discretion of this Court. We do not sit as a super jury on this
issue. Whether a death sentence in any case is disproportionate is a question of law.
Id. In another recent case, State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 324 S.E.2d 250 (1985), the court affirmed
the death penalty after citing previous cases in which the death penalty was affirmed, without a
discussion of relevant factors or relevant life imprisonment cases used in its comparison. In Vereen
defendant strangled, stabbed, and sexually assaulted his 72 year-old victim and sexually assaulted
and stabbed the victim's mentally retarded daughter. Id. at 502-04, 324 S.E.2d at 253-54. The court
concluded that "[c]onsidering both the crime and the defendant, the circumstances of this case fall
well within the class of first-degree murders in which we have previously upheld the penalty of
death." Id. at 518, 324 S.E.2d at 262.
95. 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
96. Id. at 30, 305 S.E.2d at 708.
97. Id. at 46, 305 S.E.2d at 717. Whether the crime is considered "heinous" has been signifi-
cant in several cases in which the death penalty was imposed. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408,
319 S.E.2d 189 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Craig, 308
N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 (1983); State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301
S.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983); State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1080 (1982); State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); State v.
Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); State v. Rook, 304 N.C.
201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278
S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979),
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
98. Jackson, 309 N.C. at 46, 305 S.E.2d at 717.
99. 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983). In Bondurant defendant and several acquaintances
had been drinking and driving. The victim, in the back seat of the car, expressed a desire to go
home. Defendant, in the front seat, turned and pointed a gun at the victim's face. Although the
other passengers in the car pleaded with defendant to put down the gun, defendant told the victim,
"You don't believe I'll shoot you, do you?" and fatally shot him. Id. at 677, 309 S.E.2d at 173.
100. Id. at 693, 309 S.E.2d at 182.
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helpful to law enforcement officials. 10 1 The court noted that "[i]n no other capi-
tal case among those in our proportionality pool did the defendant express con-
cern for the victim's life or remorse for his action by attempting to secure
immediate medical attention for the deceased." The court stressed, however,
that the expression of remorse was not controlling for purposes of the propor-
tionality review.10 2 The court also noted that the totality of circumstances must
be considered on proportionality review and that the "presence or absence of a
particular factor will not necessarily be controlling." 
10 3
In State v. Hil 0 defendant was convicted of shooting a police officer to
death in the course of an eighty second encounter in which defendant ran from
the policeman, the policeman tackled defendant, and defendant got control of
the officer's gun and shot him. 105 The court found only two previous cases in
which the victim was a police officer and compared Hill to these. On roughly
similar facts one defendant had received the death penalty and the other had
received only life imprisonment. 10 6 Because of this irreconcilable disparity in
sentencing, the court did not find these cases helpful in assessing proportionality
and thus proceeded to compare Hill to the "entire pool of cases in which the
death penalty had been affirmed."' 0 7 Based on this comparison and on the cir-
cumstances surrounding the murder, the court vacated the death penalty.
0 8
The court employed an interesting method in Hill to conduct its propor-
tionality review. First, the court compared the only two previous cases in which
the defendant had been convicted when an aggravating circumstance had been
the commission of a "capital felony. . . against a law enforcement officer."' 10 9
When this comparison proved fruitless, the court did not try to compare Hill
with cases in the pool based on other nonstatutory variables, such as the exist-
ence of a "struggle" in the case or the presence of alcohol. Instead, the court
proceeded to distinguish Hill from dissimilar death penalty cases. The court
grouped these dissimilar cases into five categories: "heinous" murder cases,
cases of torturous crimes, cases in which the crime was part of a violent course
of conduct, felony murder cases, and cases in which the crime had been coldly
101. Id. at 693-94, 309 S.E.2d at 182-83.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 693 n.1, 309 S.E.2d at 182 n.1.
104. 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984).
105. The police officer stopped to check Hill's parked car, which earlier had been observed cir-
cling the block. Apparently, Hill was trying to locate the house of an acquaintance. Id. at 467, 319
S.E.2d at 165. Hill did not testify, id. at 467, 319 S.E.2d at 166, so it is unclear why he fled from the
police officer.
106. Id. at 477, 319 S.E.2d at 171. The two other cases in the proportionality pool in which
policemen were the victims were State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983) (defendant
received life imprisonment for the shooting of a police officer during the course of an armed robbery)
and State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981) (death penalty affirmed for defendant
who shot and killed two officers who came to defendant's home to investigate a domestic
disturbance).
107. Hill, 311 N.C. at 477-78, 319 S.E.2d at 171 (The "great disparity of sentences in those two
cases renders any meaningful comparison in this limited pool virtually impossible.").
108. Id. at 479-80, 319 S.E.2d at 172.
109. Id. at 477, 319 S.E.2d at 171 (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8) (1983)).
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calculated. 110 The court did not explain why cases in these categories were con-
sidered sufficiently similar to be appropriate for use in comparative proportional-
ity. Thus, Hill implicitly approved a procedure in which proportionality review
can be conducted primarily by distinguishing dissimilar death penalty cases in
the absence of relevant similar cases with which to compare the case under
review.111
The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated a death sentence on propor-
tionality grounds for the fourth time in State v. Young. 112 In conducting the
110. Id. at 478, 319 S.E.2d at 172.
111. Two strong dissents by Justices Meyer and Mitchell criticized the manner in which the
majority conducted the proportionality review. Justice Meyer argued that the court erred in com-
paring Hill only with brutal murder cases and cases in which the jury had found more than two
aggravating circumstances because these two types of cases were not sufficiently similar to Hill to
yield relevant comparison. He suggested instead that the court focus on the "targeted victim, the
motive for the killing, and important policy considerations" in the case under review. Id. at 484, 319
S.E.2d at 175 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The killing of a law enforcement officer should warrant the
death penalty "[i]n the absence of compelling circumstances which would militate against a sentence
of death" because "the effective administration ofjustice requires that some murders must indeed be
treated as different 'in kind and not merely in degree from other murders.'" Id. at 485, 319 S.E.2d
at 175 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Hill, 311 N.C. at 488, 319 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J., dissent-
ing)) (emphasis added).
Justice Mitchell also argued that the majority's comparison was flawed. Mitchell would have
upheld the jury's death penalty in this case based on the lack of relevant similar cases for comparison
purposes and on public policy supporting effective law enforcement. He noted:
The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official
duties differs in kind and not merely in degree from other murders. When in the perform-
ance of his duties, a law enforcement officer is the representative of the public and a symbol
of the rule of law. The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of
his duties in the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire public-the body politic--and is a
direct attack upon the rule of law which must prevail if our society as we know it is to
survive.
A jury having found after solemn consideration that the defendant killed a law en-
forcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties and that this aggravating
circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances and called for the penalty of death,
I do not believe that we should hold the penalty disproportionate.
Id. at 488, 318 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
The dissents' arguments are erroneous for two reasons. First, the statute clearly requires that
the case under review be compared to similar cases. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
Any analysis that depends primarily on policy considerations instead of similar cases is inappropri-
ate. To rely on policy considerations under these circumstances is to apply the wrong standard of
review: the statute does not require a finding that the death penalty is appropriate for a certain kind
of crime, such as murders of police officers, but instead requires a finding that the case is sufficiently
similar to other cases in the comparison pool to warrant imposition of the death penalty.
Second, the court may use its discretion to give the factors in a proportionality review different
weight, depending on the facts and circumstances in each case. An analysis that adopts a single
factor as controlling for comparison purposes, however, is erroneous under the Supreme Court's
prohibition against any "automatic" imposition of the death penalty without consideration of all the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976). In Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court
held that a Louisiana statute imposing a mandatory death penalty for the murder of a police officer
was unconstitutional. The Court recognized the state's special interest in protecting public servants,
but insisted that other circumstances must be taken into consideration before the imposition of a
death sentence will be deemed constitutional. The Court did not require that these circumstances be
"compelling." Id. at 637; cf. Hill, 311 N.C. 485, 319 S.E.2d at 175 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
112. 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985). In Young defendant suggested that he and two ac-
complices go to the victim's house to rob and kill him. The three men gained entrance to the vic-
tim's house on a pretext, whereupon defendant stabbed the victim twice in the chest, and one
accomplice stabbed the victim several times in the back. Id. at 672, 325 S.E.2d at 184.
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proportionality review the court focused on the two statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances found by the jury: murder committed for pecuniary gain, 1 13 and
murder committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of an armed
robbery. 114 The court cited twenty-three robbery-murder cases in which the
jury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment and five robbery-murder cases
in which the defendant was sentenced to death.1 15 The court wished to make it
"abundantly clear," however, that the mere difference in the number of cases in
which life imprisonment was imposed and the number of cases in which death
was imposed was not dispositive in determining proportionality.1 1 6 The court
found the death penalty to be disproportionate because "[tihe facts presented by
this appeal more closely resemble those cases in which the jury recommended
life imprisonment than those in which the defendant was sentenced to death."1 17
The court then specifically compared Young with three cases: two in which life
imprisonment was imposed for robbery-murder and one in which the death pen-
alty was vacated on proportionality grounds. 118 The court noted that in the two
life imprisonment cases, the juries had found four and six aggravating circum-
stances (including, in both cases, the two aggravating circumstances found in
Young) and still had declined to impose the death penalty. 119 The court also
compared Young to Jackson, in which the death penalty was vacated on propor-
tionality grounds,' 2 0 and found the two cases similar. 121 Finally, the court ex-
amined a group of robbery-murder cases in which the defendant received the
death penalty and found the cases dissimilar. 122 This finding of dissimilarity
was based on the facts that the Young murder was not as "egregious" as the
murders in the comparison cases, that the defendant in Young had not been
engaged in a course of conduct which included the commission of violence
against another person, and that the murder in Young was "not especially hei-
nous, atrocious or cruel."' 123
The proportionality review conducted in Young clearly is superior to the
perfunctory review conducted by the court in many previous death penalty
cases. The court cited not only relevant cases in which the death penalty had
been affirmed but also relevant life imprisonment cases and a case in which the
death penalty had been vacated on proportionality grounds. In addition to cit-
ing these cases, the court discussed the factors in the cases that made them rele-
vant for comparison purposes. This approach not only evidences a thorough
113. Id. at 690, 325 S.E.2d at 192. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1983).
114. Young, 312 N.C. at 690, 325 S.E.2d at 192. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (1983).
115. Young, 312 N.C. at 687-88 n.1, 325 S.E.2d at 192 n.l.
116. Id. at 688, 325 S.E.2d at 193.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 689-90, 325 S.E.2d at 193-94. The court compared Young to State v. Jackson, 309
N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983) (death penalty vacated on proportionality grounds); State v. Whise-
nant, 308 N.C. 791, 303 S.E.2d 784 (1983) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment); and State v.
Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment).
119. Young, 312 N.C. at 689-90, 325 S.E.2d at 193-94.
120. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
121. Young, 312 N.C. at 690, 325 S.E.2d at 194.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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consideration by the court of the particular facts and circumstances of the case
under review in comparison to the facts and circumstances of prior cases, but
also gives the bar necessary guidance as to which factors are important in com-
parative proportionality review.
A clear conclusion emerges from an analysis of cases in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court has applied the comparative proportionality review to
uphold or vacate a death penalty. Although the court recognizes the importance
of a meaningful proportionality review, 124 its performance has been strikingly
inconsistent. The cases in which the court has conducted an in-depth analysis of
the similarities of both the relevant death penalty and life imprisonment cases
1 25
sharply contrast with the cases in which the court has applied a perfunctory
review as a mere formality in affirming a death sentence.1 26 Although the court
has clearly indicated that it does not feel compelled to cite every relevant case
from the proportionality pool in conducting its review, 127 at least some guidance
is necessary in every decision. Without any analysis of, or citations to, the con-
trolling cases, the bar can only speculate about the factors relevant to sentencing
decisions at the appellate level.128
In summary, the court has recognized that certain factors are important for
comparison purposes in proportionality review. These include the statutory ag-
gravating 129 and mitigating' 30 circumstances, the general type of crime,131 the
number of victims involved, 132 the defendant's character, background, physical
and emotional condition,133 the manner in which the victim died,134 and
whether the murder was especially heinous or bloodthirsty. 135 The court also
has held that special policy considerations may apply in witness elimination and
police murder cases.136 Overall, the court has tended to compare cases under
124. "[A]ny imposition of the death penalty. . . should be searchingly reviewed. . . to insure
the absence of unfairness, arbitrariness or caprice in the result." State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 63,
257 S.E.2d 597, 610 (1979). "[W]e consider the responsibility placed on us by [N.C. GEN. STAT.]
§ 15A-2000(d)(2) as serious as any responsibility placed upon an appellate court." State v. Rook,
304 N.C. 201, 236, 283 S.E.2d 732, 753 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
125. See, e.g., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C.
632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
126. See, eg., State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984).
127. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81, 301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
128. See State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 61, 292 S.E.2d 203, 254 (Exum, J., dissenting) ("The bar is
entitled to know upon what basis we are conducting the proportionality review .... We should not
continue to keep the manner in which we perform this duty shrouded in mystery."), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1056 (1982).
129. See, eg., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465,
319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
130. See e.g., State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984); State v. McDougall, 308
N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983).
131. See, e.g., State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984);
State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
132. See, e.g., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1,
320 S.E.2d 642 (1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1232 (1985).
133. See, eg., State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
134. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984).
135. See, eg., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465,
319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
136. See, eg., State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1,
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review with relevant death penalty cases more often than with relevant life im-
prisonment cases. The court, however, has not developed a framework for de-
ciding which variables should be controlling for comparison purposes or how
these variables should be chosen for any particular case. This lack of a consis-
tent approach to comparative proportionality review is arguably an unconstitu-
tional exercise of "unbridled discretion" by the court in affirming sentencing
decisions in capital cases. On the other hand, the court must not go too far in
creating rigid guidelines by which to assess the similarities between cases be-
cause such inflexibility also is constitutionally suspect.
137
There are two compelling reasons for the continued development and appli-
cation of a meaningful comparative proportionality review. First, proportional-
ity review provides a vital safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty by ensuring that the penalty will not be imposed
on a defendant when there "is no principled way to distinguish [the] case, in
which the death penalty [would be] imposed, from the many cases in which it
was not." 138 Second, because it requires analysis and comparison of both death
penalty and life imprisonment cases, proportionality review is the only effective
way for the reviewing court to be certain that its sentencing decisions reflect
contemporary attitudes about which crimes and which defendants warrant the
death penalty. 139 The North Carolina Supreme Court has made tremendous
progress in giving the statutorily mandated proportionality review depth and
substance. A clearly defined, consistent framework 1'4 for approaching the com-
parative analysis, however, still is needed as an additonal safeguard in the appli-
cation of the death penalty. 141 In developing such a framework the court should
emphasize the need to consider more life imprisonment cases as a part of the
comparative review. Case comparisons must be full, multifaceted examinations
301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183
(1981).
137. "IN]either unbridled, unguided discretion, nor the absence of all discretion in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty is constitutionally permissible." State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 58, 257
S.E.2d 597, 607 (1979).
138. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
139. See supra note 4.
140. Such a framework could emphasize the totality of circumstances approach articulated in
Bondurant, see text accompanying note 103, while setting forth a specific method of review. For
example, the court might first look to the proportionality pool for cases in which the aggravating and
mitigating factors are similar. Next, the court might examine cases in the pool of the same general
type as the case under review, such as similar domestic relations murder cases or similar struggle
cases. Third, the court could compare the case under review with other cases on any variables
deemed relevant in the particular case, such as intoxication or age of the defendant. Last, the court
could balance these comparisons in a totality of circumstances approach to decide whether the death
penalty should be affirmed.
141. Such a framework becomes more critical as the pool, already containing 88 cases, continues
to grow, making relevant comparisons absent any analytical framework extremely unwieldly. The
court has recognized that "[a]n analysis which involves. . . inquiry into the endless combinations,
variations, permutations, and nuances that an indepth review of every case in the pool would yield
would be a fruitless endeavor." State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 519, 324 S.E.2d 250, 263 (1985).
Thus a framework is imperative to help narrow the pool of cases to be compared and to focus the
court's attention on the particular factors relevant to similarity comparisons in each case. Without
some method of limiting the number of cases to be compared in the proportionality review, the
burden imposed by the ever-growing pool of cases may encourage the court to return to the perfunc-
tory comparative proportionality review that characterized the review of earlier death penalty cases.
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of the similarities and dissimilarities between relevant cases. Although there can
be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which case governmental authority
should be used to impose death," 142 the court must attempt to strike a balance
between unbridled discretion and inflexibility to ensure effective comparative
proportionality review.
CAROLYN SIEVERS REED
142. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 881 (1984).
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APPENDIX
These 88 cases comprise the proportionality pool, see supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text. Included are all applicable cases tried under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983) from 1977 to January 30, 1985. Subsequent case his-
tories are omitted in the interest of space.
This pool was compiled in part from records kept in the offices of the North
Carolina Supreme Court. The cases are divided into five categories for ease of
reference.
I. DEATH SENTENCE AFFIRMED
State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 324 S.E.2d 250 (1985)
State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984)
State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 320 S.E.2d 642 (1984)
State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 319 S.E.2d 591 (1984)
State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984)
State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197 (1984)
State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984)
State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740 (1983)
State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (1983)
State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983)
State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569 (1982)
State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982)
State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264 (1982)
State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243 (1982)
State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981)
State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981)
State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981)
State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981)
State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981)
State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286 (1980)
State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979)
II. DEATH SENTENCE VACATED ON PROPORTIONALITY GRouNDs
State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985)
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984)
State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983)
State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983)
III. DEATH SENTENCE VACATED FOR ERROR
State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 321 S.E.2d 837 (1984)
State v. Beal, 311 N.C. 555, 319 S.E.2d 557 (1984)
State v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 332, 312 S.E.2d 393 (1983)
State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980)
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IV. LIFE SENTENCE-JURY RECOMMENDATION
State v. Payne, 312 N.C. 647, 325 S.E.2d 205 (1985)
State v. Harold, 312 N.C. 787, 325 S.E.2d 219 (1985)
State v. McCray, 312 N.C. 519, 324 S.E.2d 606 (1985)
State v. Hannah, 312 N.C. 286, 322 S.E.2d 148 (1984)
State v. Withers, 311 N.C. 699, 319 S.E.2d 211 (1984)
State v. Wilson, 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984)
State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596, 313 S.E.2d 556 (1984)
State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984)
State v. Bauguss, 310 N.C. 259, 311 S.E.2d 248 (1984)
State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 311 S.E.2d 256 (1984)
State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 311 S.E.2d 540 (1984)
State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1983)
State v. Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 308 S.E.2d 277 (1983)
State v. Booker, 309 N.C. 446, 306 S.E.2d 771 (1983)
State v. Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983)
State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983)
State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 305 S.E.2d 685 (1983)
State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983)
State v. Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983)
State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679, 300 S.E.2d 366 (1983)
State v. Barnett, 307 N.C. 608, 300 S.E.2d 340 (1983)
State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982)
State v. Brock, 305 N.C. 532, 290 S.E.2d 566 (1982)
State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982)
State v. Fox, 305 N.C. 280, 287 S.E.2d 887 (1982)
State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982)
State v. Lake, 305 N.C. 143, 286 S.E.2d 541 (1982)
State v. Marshall, 304 N.C. 167, 282 S.E.2d 422 (1981)
State v. Adcox, 303 N.C. 133, 277 S.E.2d 398 (1981)
State v. Miller, 302 N.C. 572, 276 S.E.2d 417 (1981)
State v. Hawkins, 302 N.C. 364, 275 S.E.2d 172 (1981)
State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 273 (1981)
State v. Smith, 301 N.C. 695, 272 S.E.2d 852 (1981)
State v. Moore, 301 N.C. 262, 271 S.E.2d 242 (1980)
State v. Clark, 301 N.C. 176, 270 S.E.2d 425 (1980)
State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980)
State v. Crawford, 301 N.C. 212, 270 S.E.2d 102 (1980)
State v. Weimer, 300 N.C. 642, 268 S.E.2d 216 (1980)
State v. Clark, 300 N.C. 116, 265 S.E.2d 204 (1980)
State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980)
State v. Horton, 299 N.C. 690, 263 S.E.2d 745 (1980)
State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 263 S.E.2d 768 (1980)
State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980)
State v. Ferdinando, 298 N.C. 737, 260 S.E.2d 423 (1979)
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State v. Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979)
State v. Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 259 S.E.2d 227 (1979)
State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979)
State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 252 S.E.2d 745 (1979)
V. LIFE SENTENCE-IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE BECAUSE
JURY UNABLE TO AGREE
State v. McDonald, 312 N.C. 264, 321 S.E.2d 849 (1984)
State v. Jenkins, 311 N.C. 194, 317 S.E.2d 345 (1984)
State v. Heptinstall, 309 N.C. 231, 306 S.E.2d 109 (1983)
State v. Whisenant, 308 N.C. 791, 303 S.E.2d 784 (1983)
State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 302 S.E.2d 164 (1983)
State v. Norwood, 303 N.C. 473, 279 S.E.2d 550 (1981)
State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 278 S.E.2d 200 (1981)
State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410 (1981)
State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980)
State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980)
State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d 263 (1979)
